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I.

INTRODUCTION

Stripped to its essentials, the State's Brief advocates a fundamental injustice in this capital case.

The State admits William

Andrews did not kill any of the victims of this crime •— despite the
contrary suggestions at trial.

The State does not contest that

Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness at trial taints the record here on the
critical issue of the degree of Mr. Andrews1 participation in the
crimes.

The State virtually concedes a lesser included offense

instruction should have been given to the jury that convicted William
Andrews.

The State does not dispute the affidavits of William

Andrews' lawyers that the failure to earlier raise the issue of
failure to instruct on lesser included offenses, was not the result of
any tactical decision on their part —

or Mr. Andrews' own affidavit

that he was never told anything about this question.

The State does

not deny that the failure to give a warranted lesser included offense
instruction in a capital case is prejudicial and injects a level of
unreliability into the decision to impose the death penalty,
unacceptable under the Eighth Amendment.

Yet the State urges this

Court to uphold William Andrews' sentence of death, solely because his
court-appointed and volunteer lawyers —
courts of the time —

like the prosecutors and

did not anticipate the line of state and federal

cases on which the issue here rests, years before it emerged.
With life at stake, this Court should not allow itself to be made
a party to such unprincipled maneuverings.

II.

RESTATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner's Brief documented critical omissions by trial counsel
which if pursued, would have presented to the jury a view of
Mr. Andrews1 participation which was much more favorable to his
defense. (Pet. Brief, pp. 6-10; 12; 14-18; 29-34, 36).
The State's Statement of Facts attempts to blur distinctions in
the trial evidence between the acts of Mr. Pierre and those of
Mr. Andrews. Moreover, the State's presentation overstates the trial
evidence of Mr. Andrews' participation.
ously mislead the Court.
Assertion;

This hyperbole could seri-

We treat here the more serious examples.

"As he [Orren] approached the basement stairway,

Andrews and Pierre confronted him with guns and forced him down the
stairs.

Pierre's gun discharged twice, startling Andrews (who was

standing in front of Pierre at the time) and prompting him to say,
'What did you do that for, man?' (3071-72)."

Brief, p. 5.

There was

no testimony that Orren was "forced" down the stairs by Mr. Andrews.
Orren testified at 3069, "the man at the top of the stairs [Pierre]
waved the gun, his gun to indicate for me to go down the stairs," and
at 3070 that "[Andrews] was holding his gun on me at the bottom of the
stairs."
Assertion:

"When Orren refused to administer the caustic sub-

stance, Andrews placed a gun at his head and threatened him by saying,
'Man, there is a gun at your head!' (3078)."

Brief, p. 6.

At p. 3078

Orren testified that Mr. Andrews was standing "approximately maybe
four feet from me" and that "he had his gun in his hand.
had it aimed at my head."

I am sure he

There was no testimony that Mr. Andrews
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"placed" the gun at his head.

Mr. Andrews did nothing when Mr. Walker

refused to administer the liquid.
Assertion;

"Pierre captured her [Carol] at gunpoint upstairs

while Andrews guarded the other victims."
p. 6.

(No citation).

Brief,

At p. 3082 Orren testified simply that Mr. Andrews was "at the

bottom of the steps" when Carol came in.
Assertion:
3128, 3182)."

" . . . Andrews continued to pour . . . (3084-87,

Brief, p. 6.

Orren testified that Mr. Andrews poured

each of the doses of Drano, but at 3182-83, on cross-examination, he
admitted that he only saw Mr. Andrews pour the liquid in the cup the
first time and "wasn't really observing Mr* Andrews after that point."
Assertion:

"At no time did Andrews display any fear over pouring

the Drano, and at no time did either assailant threaten the other if
he did not administer the substance (3208, 3211)."

Although these

record references are correct, the testimony was in response to leading questions to which Mr. Caine did not object.

They also ignore

Orren1s testimony at 3183-84:
Q:

So at some point concerning the administration of the liquid this statement ["I
can't do it, I am scared"] was also
said?

A:

That's correct.

Q:

That you are clear about?

A:

Nodding his head up and down.1

1

Mr. Walker's testimony at the preliminary hearing made it clear
that Mr. Andrews made this statement just before Mr. Pierre began
administering the liquid. See Pet. Br. at p. 7.
The State also asserts that "Both assailants then covered three
of the victims1 mouths with tape" Brief, p. 7. Yet at the preliminary
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Assertion;

"Orren heard mumbled conversation between the assail-

ants, but could only discern Andrews saying, fI can't do it, I am
scared,1 and later Pierre's reply to Andrews of 'about 30 minutes.'
(3092-93, 3095, 3187)."

Brief, p. 8.

clear from the cited testimony.

The sequence of events is not

Orren testified at 3094-95 that

Mr. Pierre took his watch and wallet just before Mr. Pierre said
"about 30 minutes."

There is no indication that Mr. Pierre's comment

was in "reply" to Mr. Andrews saying "I can't do it, I am scared."
Mr. Andrews left the scene right after Mr. Pierre said "about 30
minutes" (3095-96) and was not seen again by Orren.
HI-

ARGUMENT

A. Introduction
The State spends more than sixty pages of its brief setting forth
the facts and arguing that this Court, unlike the court below, should
refuse to address the merits of the petition and instead, dismiss it
as procedurally barred or as an abuse of the writ.
The State also seeks to avoid the full impact of Mr. Caine's
ineffectiveness by ignoring the evidence which was available at trial
but not utilized by him to differentiate the level of Mr. Andrews'
participation from that of Mr. Pierre.

The State does not argue that

these omissions did not demonstrate ineffectiveness of trial counsel.

(Footnote Continued)
hearing Mr. Walker's testimony was that Mr. Pierre taped his mouth,
and that he could not see who else was taped or who did the taping.
PH Tr. 32-39,
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The State does not even attempt to argue that these glaring omissions
were reasoned decisions in furtherance of a "trial strategy,"

No con-

ceivable trial strategy would have wasted the opportunity to bring out
to the jury that:
1.

Mr. Andrews did not continue to pour the liquid as
Mr. Pierre administered it.
it, Ifm scared."

2.

Pet. Brief, p. 7.

Mr. Andrews did not participate in taping the mouth of any
victim.

3.

He refused, saying, "I can't do

J[cL at p. 8.

Mr. Pierre's taping of the victims' mouths occurred 30-40
minutes after the liquid had been administered, and was not
for the purpose of keeping the liquid in, but rather to keep
the victims silent.

4.

Id. at pp. 9-10.

Whatever it was that Mr. Pierre wanted Mr. Andrews to do
around 9:00 p.m. that evening, Mr. Andrews refused to do,
again saying, "I can't do it, I'm scared."

He left the

store within minutes, and was not seen or heard again by
Mr. Walker.

X_d. at p. 9.

The State does not even attempt to deny the prejudicial effect of
these omitted points.

The omitted evidence strongly supported

Mr. Andrews' defense that he did not intend that killing take place;
he actively refused to take part in the administration of the liquid
and in the subsequent killings.

The trial evidence that the jury did

hear thus exaggerated or misstated Mr. Andrews' participation in the
critical events which every reviewing court, including this Court,
used to satisfy itself that the evidence of Mr. Andrews' guilt of
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first degree murder was overwhelming.

Clearly this "evidence" was

tainted by Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness.
All of these omissions are directly relevant to the substantive
issue presented by the petition, Mr. Andrews1 entitlement to a jury
instruction on second degree felony murder.
The State spends only five pages addressing the merits of this
issue.

We begin our reply by addressing those arguments.

B. The Evidence Supported a Second Degree
Felony Murder Instruction.
Contrary to the State's assertion, there is no requirement that
the evidence in support of the lesser included offense instruction be
"compelling" (Brief, pp. 61-62); rather the issue is simply whether
the evidence "provide(d) a rationale basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense."2
The State's assertion that Judge Young's "denial of relief should
be affirmed on the ground that the absence of the instruction did not
result in a constitutional violation, "(Brief, p. 63) would directly
contravene the holding of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), and
this Court's decision in

State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984).

Even the record which overstated Mr. Andrews' participation
clearly supported an interpretation that Mr. Andrews did not intend
that any killing take place.
him to the instruction.

That is all that was required to entitle

The contrary conclusion reached by the

district court is unsupported in the evidence and error.

2

State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 at 424, quoting from State v.
Baker, 671 P.2d 152 at 159. See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4).

C. The Failure to Give the Instruction Violated
Mr, Andrews1 Rights Under the Eighth Amendment,
The State concedes that since Beck v, Alabama, 447 U.S. 625
(1980)f in capital cases the failure to give lesser included offense
instructions violates the defendant's constitutional rights, where the
evidence would support the instruction.

See Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815

F.2d 597, 601 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 296 (1987).
The State seeks to avoid the Beck decision by arguing that the
failure to ask for the felony murder instruction and the failure to
object to the absence of the instruction did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because it was part of an "all or nothing"
trial strategy.

(Brief, pp. 63-64).

We are puzzled by this assertion, as it directly contradicts the
State's concession, buried in footnote 36:
"Because the State has no reason to doubt the testimony of petitioner's counsel in their affidavits
concerning a deliberate withholding of the issues
the State does not assert that prong of the abuse
of the writ doctrine as a basis for dismissal of
the petition." Brief, p. 40.
Regardless of whether the State concedes the point, the record below
is uncontroverted.

Mr. Cainefs affidavit states in pertinent part:

"In connection with Mr. Andrews' defense, I took
exception to the trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury of the lesser included offense of second
degree murder. I did not make any tactical decision to withhold the lesser included offense of
second degree murder from the jury, and affirmatively objected to the court's refusal to submit
that lesser included offense. My arguments to the
jury did not discuss the alternative of second
degree murder because the jury was not instructed
on that alternative." Add. at pp. 12-13.
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The foregoing statement clearly shows that Mr. Caine, rather than
choosing to take an all or nothing approach, was forced to do so by
the court's ruling.

Such a response does not constitute "an objec-

tively justifiable trial strategy" (Brief, p. 63) but rather an
attempt to make the best out of a bad situation.

Mr. Caine1s joining

in the exceptions to the failure to give the lesser included offense
instructions which were proferred is also totally inconsistent with
the State's belated theory of an all or nothing trial strategy.

It

similarly distinguishes this case from the "all or nothing" cases
cited by the State.3
The State argues unconvincingly that the lesser included offense
instructions which were tendered in behalf of Mr. Pierre, and as to
which Mr. Caine did object to the court's refusal, should be ignored
because these instructions were inconsistent with the defense theme
that no death was intended by Mr. Andrews.

(Brief, p. 64). That

assertion is only partially true as to Mr. Pierre's proposed instruction No. 3, and completely untrue as to proposed instructions 4 though
12.

See State Add., Appendix B.

The trial court's refusal of these

instructions clearly violated Mr. Andrews' Eighth Amendment rights
under Beck.
We turn then to the issue of Beck's application to the felony
murder instruction, where it was supported by the evidence but not
requested by Mr. Caine nor given sua sponte by the trial judge.

3

ILa., State v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1977); Maynor v. Green,
547 F.Supp. 264 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Aldrich v. Wainwriqht, 777 F.2d 630
(11th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 324 (1986); Rawlins v.
Craven, 329 F.Supp. 40 (CD. Calif. 1971); Poulson v. Turner, 359 F.2d
588 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966); State v. Mitchell,
278 P.2d 618 (Utah 1955).

D. Beck Requires that the Trial Court
Instruct on Lesser Included Offenses
Regardless of Whether Requested.
This Court has long recognized that the failure to give a warranted lesser included offense instruction, even though not requested
by the defendant, can be reversible error.

State v. Cobo, 60 Pe2d

952, 958 (Utah 1936); State v. Mitchell, 278 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah
1955); State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 145 (Utah 1983); State v. Close,
499 P.2d 287, 288-89 (Utah 1972).

This should be particularly true in

capital cases, where this Court has traditionally gone to great
lengths, including sua sponte review, to protect the rights of those
facing the death penalty.

State v. Standrod, 547 P.2d 215 (Utah

1976); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988); State v.
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338,
1345, 1353 (Utah 1977); State v. Stenback, 2 P.2d 105 (Utah 1931);
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 552-53 (Utah 1987).
In applying Beck the Ninth Circuit has held that it was constitutional error for the trial court to fail to give a lesser included
offense instruction, even where not requested by the defendant *
Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 373-74 (9th Cir. 1986)f cert.
denied, 107 S.Ct. 928 (1987).

In reaching this result the court

rejected the argument which the State advances here, namely that the
evidence in support of the instruction must be "compelling."

(Brief,

p. 62). .Id. at 373. Creation here of a standard of compelling evidence would contravene both U.C.A. § 76-1-402(4), and this Court's
long standing precedents as to the quality of the evidence required.1*

4

The Tenth Circuit has adopted a compelling standard to the review
of failures to give lesser included offenses in non-capital cases, but
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The State also urges that the evidence in support of the second
degree felony murder instruction would have to be compelling before
Mr. Caine could be held to be ineffective for failing to request it
(Brief, pp. 61-62).

That would hardly be a proper test here, where it

is obvious that the instruction best fit the theory of the defense,
and Mr. Caine was well aware of the trial evidence in support of
unintentional killing, in fact arguing it to the jury.
E. Mr. Caine1s General Ineffectiveness at Trial and
on Appeal Were at Issue in the District Court and
are Properly Before this Court.
The State urges that the required showing of ineffective assistance of counsel is at least the same for generally overturning a conviction as it is for excusing procedural default or abuse of the writ
(Brief, pp. 42, 46-51).

If this is so, then petitioner should be

afforded the same latitude in proving the general ineffectiveness of
his counsel and the resulting prejudice in either case.
However here the State seeks to artificially limit the issue of
ineffectiveness to the single question of failure to advocate the giving of an instruction on second degree felony murder.

This test would

preclude the full review of the record which the Court prefers in
making the determinations of whether counsel was in fact ineffective
and whether the ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice.5

(Footnote Continued)
adheres to the normal standard under Beck in capital cases. Trui illo
v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d at 601, 603: "Thus there is clearly now a constitutional right to a lesser included offense instruction when the
death penalty is imposed and the evidence warrants the instruction."
Ld. at 601.
5

State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1206 (Utah 1984); State v. Frame,
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

The State seeks to impose this unfavored limitation by asserting
that ineffectiveness as to the failure regarding the felony murder
instruction was the only ineffectiveness urged in the petition and in
the proceedings before the district court (Brief at pp. 23-24; 51-52).
Yet in the district court Petitioner's Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss relied as well upon Mr. Caine's general
ineffectiveness both at trial6 and on appeal.7
The affidavits of Messrs. Hill (Add. at 14-16) and Athay (Add. at
17-19) clearly raise questions about Mr. Caine's general ineffectiveness which go beyond the single issue surrounding the lesser
included offense instruction.

This evidence came in without objection

from the State. Nor did the State seek to limit the more general
assertions as to Mr. Caine's overall effectiveness which were argued
at the hearing below.
Finally, it is clear that the district court here considered and
ruled on the broader issue of ineffectiveness (Mem. Decision, pp. 2-3;
4) f and ruled on the adequacy of the evidence in support of the more
general assertion.

Judge Young considered the petition in light of

the evidence before him.8

6

" . . . [T]he cause for that [procedural default] lies in
Mr. Caine's inexperience and his inability to render effective assistance in a capital trial of this complexity . . . " p. 9.
7

"On appeal Mr. Caine clearly did an ineffective job in representing Mr. Andrews. . . . Mr. Caine's failure to clearly raise the
second degree murder issue was a result of that ineffectiveness.
. . . The seven-page brief filed by Mr. Caine clearly fell below prevailing professional norms for representation of clients in capital
cases in the State of Utah." pe 10.
8

See H.C. Tr., pp. 5-9; 11-12; 19-20; 22-23; 31; 33-35.
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The State argues that Mr. Cainefs affidavit and his conduct in
joining in the lesser included offenses instruction exception at trial
should be ignored.

According to the State, if there is a hypothetical

"objectively justifiable trial strategy" (Brief, p. 50, n. 39; p. 63)
any factual inquiry is foreclosed over whether that was in fact the
trial strategy employed or whether counsel was in fact ineffective.
If that were the case, then the numerous cases which reflect evidentiary hearings regarding ineffectiveness, where the issue of trial
strategy is fully explored, would simply reflect needless judicial
inquiry.9

Of course the trial record itself may provide the answer,

clearly showing a deliberate withholding and/or an "all or nothing"
trial strategy.10

But that is not this case.

F. Abuse of the Writ Does Not Apply
To This Successor Petition.
The State argues that this petition should be barred as abusive
because the issue raised here based upon Beck should or could have
been raised in November, 1978, when the first State petition was
filed.

Since Beck was decided on June 20, 1980, some twenty months

after the first petition was filed, the State is reduced to arguing
that counsel should have been able to foresee the result in Beck based

9

Aldrich v. Wainwriqht, 777 F.2d 630 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 107 S.Ct. 324 (1986); Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1508-10
(10th Cir. 1987); Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1009 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983); Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501f
1513 (10th Cir. 1987); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984).
10

Maynor v. Green, 547 F. Supp 264 (S.D. Ga. 1982); State v.
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59-60 (Utah 1982), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)(cautionary instruction on
photo identification required).
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upon the state of the case law in November, 1978.

The State thus

argues that Beck was not novel, and hence no "good cause" is shown for
failing to raise it in the prior State petition.

The court below gave

no rationale for its conclusion that "the defendant could or should
have raised the issues contained in this present Petition either on
appeal, or in prior post-conviction relief . . . ." Mem. Decision,
p. 3 (Add. p. 3 ) .
The State, in supposedly addressing the issue of abuse of the
writ, goes to considerable lengths to demonstrate that the concept of
felony murder has long been recognized in Utah, as has the doctrine
that failure to instruct on a warranted lesser included offense is
reversible error.

(Brief, pp. 29-33).

the issue of failure to raise the

Those facts are irrelevant to

Beck issue in the first State peti-

tion, for mere errors are not cognizable under Rule 65B(i); only constitutional issues could be raised in the first petition.
The State also interjects ineffectiveness of counsel into its
abuse of the writ discussion.

(Brief, pp. 40-52).

It argues that

there is no right to effective counsel in post-conviction proceedings
(Brief, pp. 41-42).ll

That is entirely inappropriate, as it is not

petitioner's position that there were defects in the first petition
that were due to ineffective counsel, or that the failure to raise the

11

While there may not be any Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
post-conviction proceedings, the Fourth Circuit, in a recent en banc
opinion, has recognized a right to counsel in State post-conviction
proceedings based upon the death-sentenced petitioner's right to
access to the courts pursuant to Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
Giarrantano v. Murray, No. 87-7518 and 87-7519 (4th Cir. June 3,
1988). The State had cited the original panel decision, 836 F.2d 1421
(4th Cir. 1988) which has now been reversed. Brief, p. 42.
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Beck issue there constituted ineffective assistance.

Given

Mr. Caine's inexperience and the time constraints faced by Mr. Ford
when he entered the case,12 it is disingenuous for the State to argue
that counsel could have fashioned a Beck issue.
The "good cause" for not raising Beck in the first petition is
Beck's novelty and unavailability.

That unavailability excuses both

Mr. Caine and Mr. Ford, and thus the State's point that petitioner
does not claim that Mr. Ford was ineffective is a nullity (Brief, pp.
40, fn. 37; 51). Mr. Ford, of course did not participate as counsel
at either the trial or the direct appeal.
Similarly the State's contention that the standard for finding
ineffective assistance that excuses abuse of the writ should be more
difficult than the ineffectiveness standards of

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)(Brief, pp. 42-46), is simply inapplicable to petitioner's showing of good cause under Rule 65B(i)(4).13
We turn then to the State's contention that Beck was not novel.

12

Mr. Ford entered the case at a time when Mr. Andrews' execution
was imminent; he had to rely entirely on Mr. Caine; the first petition
was dismissed by the trial court two days after it was filed. See
Ford Affidavit, Add. at 9-10. The time factor was an "objective
factor external to the defense . . .," Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 488 (1986).
13

The only authority for this proposition is Judge Tjoflat's dissenting opinion in Moore v. Kemp, 824 F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S.Ct. 1467 (1988). This Court's application of
Strickland has not demonstrated any indication that the current standard is too lax. See cases cited at fn. 5, supra, p. 10.
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1.

The Beck Decision was Unforeseeable
at the Time of Petitioner's First
State Habeas Corpus Petition,

In response to petitioner's argument that Beck was a novel development in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence the State asserts that there
existed federal and state case law which "strongly suggested the due
process issue (as either a federal or state constitutional matter) . . . ."

Brief at 34. This argument is flawed for two reasons:

(1) there, in factf had been no holding by any court that raised the
failure to give a lesser included offense instruction in a capital
case to the level of a constitutional violation, (the idea had been
rejected on numerous occasions) nor were the cases leading up to Beck
a clear harbinger of Beck's final holding; (2) the State equates the
law of due process with the law of the Eighth Amendment when, in fact,
the two theories are entirely independent and distinct.
a. Until Beck, the Failure to Instruct on a Lesser
Included Offense Did Not Present a Constitutional Claim.
In order to seek relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65(i) a petitioner
must allege that "in [the] proceedings which resulted in his commitment there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Utah or both."

It is

clear that at the time of petitioner's first post-conviction relief
petition neither the Constitution of the United States nor the Constitution of the State of Utah had been held to require instructing the
jury on a lesser included offense in a capital case.

Indeed, as late

as January, 1980, a mere six months before the Supreme Court's decision in Beck, the Fifth Circuit held that the failure to give a lesser
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included offense instruction did not raise a federal constitutional
issue.

Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980).

Numerous

federal decisions had similarly held that failure to give a lesser
included offense instruction presented no federal constitutional
issue:

Kreilinq v. Field, 431 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1970); Poulson v.

Turner, supra, n. 3; DeBerrv v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1975);
Rawlins v. Craven, 329 F.Supp. 40 (CD. Calif. 1971); Grech v.
Wainwriqht, 492 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1974); Alliqood v. Wainwriqht, 440
F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1971); Hiqqins v. Wainwriqht, 424 F.2d 177 (5th
Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 905 (1970);

Flagler v. Wainwriqht, 423

F.2d 1359 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 943 (1970);
Henderson, 517 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1975).

Bonner v.

The State points to no case

prior to the 1980 Beck decision in which the failure to give a lesser
included offense instruction was held to offend the Eighth Amendment.
That the Fifth Circuit, two years after petitioner's first state
post-conviction relief petition, failed to see a constitutional issue
under facts similar to the case here, shows that the law was not clear
in 1978.

It would have required clairvoyant counsel to fashion a Beck

issue.11*

Clairvoyance is not the standard of "availability."

In arguing that Beck was easily predictable, the State relies
heavily on Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973).

Keeble, and

the other cases cited by the State in support of this argument (Joe v.

iif

The Supreme Court itself remarked about the lack of clarity in
its recent Eighth Amendment decisions: "The signals from this Court
have not, however, always been easy to decipher." Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 at 602 (1978); see also. Id. at 599, as to the "confusion
as to what was required in order to impose the death penalty in accord
with the Eighth Amendment."
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United States, 510 F.2d 1038 (10th Cir. 1974) and United States v.
Antelope, 523 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1975), reversed on other grounds, 430
U.S. 641 (1977)) are all cases involving American Indians prosecuted
under the Major Crimes Act.

All three decisions specifically declined

to reach any constitutional issue and decided the issues before them
as a matter of statutory construction.

A common theme running through

the three cases is a concern for the integrity of tribal jurisdiction
balanced against the need to provide Indians with the same type and
quality of procedural protection as was enjoyed by non-Indians charged
with the same crimes.

Keeble, 412 U.S. at 213; Joe, 510 F.2d at

1040; Antelope, 523 F.2d at 402 et. seg.
To deny Indian defendants the same protection afforded non-Indian
defendants solely because of their ethnic origin would raise constitutional questions, but the constitutional problem would be one of equal
protection, not some violation of the Eighth Amendment.

In

Antelope

the court is primarily concerned with equal protection issues and
nowhere even mentions the Eighth Amendment.

The footnote identified

by the State as evidence that the Antelope court viewed Keeble as
defining a constitutional right to a lesser included offense instruction (Brief at 36) in fact is limited to Indian defendants charged
under the Major Crimes Act.

An Indian's "constitutionally guaranteed"

right to such an instruction can be seen as an outgrowth of their
right to equal protection of the law in a setting where the enumerated
offenses of the controlling statute would have treated them differently solely for constitutionally impermissible reasons. Keeble,
Antelope and Joe do not stand for the proposition that the common law
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of the states in which the crimes occurred would be constitutionally
deficient if provision were not made for a lesser included offense
instruction.
In Beck, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the law up to that
time had recognized that a lesser included offense instruction can "be
beneficial to the defendant,"

Beck, 447 U.S. at 633, and quoted its

decision in Keeble to the effect that "we have never explicitly held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the
right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included
offense . . . ."

Id. at 634.

Thus, until Becjc, the right to a

lesser included offense instruction, while "beneficial" to a defendant, had not yet reached the level of a right of constitutional
dimension.
The State argues that because Beck relied in part on three cases
decided in 1976 dealing with state sentencing schemes in capital cases
(Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)) the petitioner here should have been able to construct a Beck-type argument in
his first State petition.

(Brief at n. 34). Those cases, however,

arose in legal settings significantly different from the question
presented here and cannot be read as clear precursors of Beck.

They

are too legally remote from the Beck decision to have served as the
basis for the argument petitioner advances here.

Woodson dealt solely

with procedures at the sentencing phase and did not consider a lesser
included offense issue; Roberts struck down a procedure requiring
instructions on lesser included offenses even if unwarranted by the

-18-

evidence, and Gregg merely held that giving such an instruction would
not violate the Constitution.

None of these cases are clear enough

signposts to alert counsel that Beck was on the horizon.
2. Due Process Precedent Does Not Accurately
Predict Eighth Amendment Law.
_ _
In response to petitioner's argument that his confinement is in
violation of the Eighth Amendment the State points to federal and
state cases which it contends suggest the due process issue raised by
petitioner.

Brief at 34. This argument fails to recognize the dif-

ference between due process precedent and precedent supporting Eighth
Amendment claims.

"It is clear that not every claim that implicates

the fundamental fairness standards embodied in the due process clause
necessarily implicates the Eighth Amendment as well."

Adams v.

Dugger, 816 F,2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1987) at n.2, cert, granted, 108
S.Ct. 1106 (1988).

The two doctrines are distinct and comprise dif-

ferent aspects of Constitutional theory.

"The distinction between

claims that implicate the fundamental fairness standards embodied in
the due process clause and those that implicate the Eighth Amendment
has been recognized from the inception of the Supreme Court's modern
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."

Ibid.

A comparison of McGautha v.

California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) points up this distinction.

In McGautha, the Supreme Court had

held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not
violated by standardless jury discretion procedures or a unified guilt
and sentencing process.
in

Ld. at 196-203 and 213-217. One year later,

Furman, the Court held that these same features of Georgia's
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capital sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment.

The due pro-

cess precedent of McGautha was an inaccurate predictor of the Eighth
Amendment law later announced in Furman.

The State concedes that

Keeble and the Utah cases it cites do not directly suggest an Eighth
Amendment violation but concludes that this distinction is not critical.

Brief at n.34.

The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurispru-

dence, however, is to the contrary.
3.

No Utah Decision Recognized a
Constitutional Issue.

With regard to a claim made under the Utah Constitution, the
State points to State v. Gillian, 463 P.2d 811 (Utah 1970) in which
this Court reversed on direct appeal a conviction of first degree
murder because the jury was not instructed on the defendant's theory
of the case, where there was evidence to justify such an instruction.
Nowhere in Gillian, however, does this Court refer to the failure to
give a lesser included offense instruction as a constitutional violation of any kind.

The State cites a number of other Utah cases (Brief

at 38), but none of them give any indication of a violation of the
federal or Utah Constitution, either based upon due process or any
other concept.

In fact, it would be six years after Mr. Andrews1

first State petition before this Court in State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d
551 (Utah 1984) would come to that conclusion.
This Court should reject the contention that in 1978 reasonably
competent counsel could have foreseen Beck, and hold that Beck's
novelty and unavailability is good cause under Rule 65B(i)(4) for not
raising the issue in the prior petition.

-20-

G. Any Procedural Default at Trial or on Direct
Appeal is Cured by the Ample Demonstration
of Cause and Prejudice Here.
The issue as to procedural default here is whether, because counsel for petitioner at trial failed to request a second degree felony
murder instruction, and failed to object to the absence of one, 15 and
failed to raise that issue on direct appeal, as well as failed to
raise the refusal of the lesser included offense instructions that
were requested, petitioner is barred from raising these issues in this
petition.
The State agrees that such procedural bars can be avoided by a
showing of cause for the prior failure and a demonstration of resulting prejudice.
1.

Brief, n. 38.

There is Cause and Prejudice to Excuse Any Default.

The first cause of the default is that at trial and on direct
appeal petitioner's counsel was ineffective.

The fact of his ineffec-

tiveness has been demonstrated in petitioner's opening brief, pp.
6-10; 12; 14-15; 16-18; 29-34; 36.

T'he State nowhere really contests

Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness, but rather attempts to excuse it as
"trial strategy."
this brief.

We have dealt with that contention elsewhere in

(supra, pp. 7-8)

We add that no alleged "trial strategy"

would excuse Mr. Caine's failures to raise these issues on direct
appeal.
The prejudice caused by this ineffectiveness is apparent:
Mr. Andrews stands sentenced to death under a constitutionally-suspect

State v. Close, 499 P.2d 287, 288-89 (Utah 1972).

-21-

conviction.

The rationale of Beck provides all the prejudice neces-

sary, for it requires that the jury be given the "third option" of the
lesser included offense.

Here that option was denied Mr. Andrews

because of Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness at the trial and on direct
appeal.

Here there was a "reasonable probability" that but for coun-

sel's ineffectiveness the result here would have been different.
State v. Lairbyf 699 P.2d 1187, 1205 (Utah 1984).
Mr. Caine's ineffectiveness included not knowing what the Utah
law was on second degree felony murder under the new 1973 statute.
Mr. Caine, according to Mr. Ford's affidavit, thought that second
degree felony murder was not covered by the new statute.
vit, pp. 2-3.l6

Ford Affida-

Not knowing what a client's rights are is of course

within the ambit of ineffective assistance.

State v. McNicol, 554

P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976); Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th
Cir. 1979).
tance.

An "uninformed error" can constitute ineffective assis-

Maynor v. Green, 547 F.Supp. 264, 268 (S.D. Ga. 1982).

So too

can the failure to raise on direct appeal, an issue which will secure
reversal.

People v. Titone, 505 N.E.2d 300, 305 (111.

1986)(dissenting opinion), cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 210 (1987);

Mr. Ford states:
I do recall at one time asking Mr. Andrews' original counsel, John Caine, whether he had considered
raising an issue regarding the trial court's
failure to instruct on second degree felony
murder, sometime after the original petition was
dismissed by this [trial] court. He told me that
section of the Utah Code was not enacted at the
trial of this case.
Add., p. 10-11.
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Robison v. Maynardy 829 F.2d 1501, 1511-12 (10th Cir. 1987); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496-97.
But for the presence of State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah
1983), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984), we could simply rely on
ineffectiveness of counsel without considering the issue of novelty.
But Norton is troubling because it held that second degree felony
murder was not available as a lesser included offense where as here
the robbery victim was killed.

Norton was this Court's first decision

construing the new second degree felony murder provisions of the 1973
statute.

Contrary to the State's implied assertion (Brief, pp. 30-32)

Utah had no well developed case law on second degree felony murder.17
This fact poses the vexing issue:

If Mr. Caine had preserved and

raised the second degree felony murder issue in the direct appeal,
would he have lost because he got the Norton decision,18 or won a
reversal because he got the Hansen decision?

If it was the former

result, petitioner is protected by unavailability, if the latter, by
ineffectiveness.

Certainly petitioner cannot lose on both theories.

17

Under the old statute it appears that if a killing occurred in
the course of certain enumerated felonies, it was first degree murder,
regardless of the defendant's intent. Only if the murder took place
in the course of an unenumerated felony was second degree felony
murder available. State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246 (Utah 1970). For this
reason the issue of second degree felony murder as a lesser included
offense of first degree murder rarely came up under the old statute.
The other two cases cited by the State (Brief, p. 31), State v.
Condit, 125 P.2d 801 (Utah 1942) and State v. Thome, 117 Pac. 58
(Utah 1911) did not involve a "lesser included offense" -- in both,
felony murder was first degree murder.
18

It is interesting to note that the State urges here that Norton
should be ignored because its error was so apparent. (Brief,
pp. 31-32), yet in Hansen the State was strenuously arguing jln. favor
of Norton; Hansen, 734 P.2d at 425-26.
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Mr. Cainefs clearly ineffective assistance at trial and on direct
appeal constitutes cause for any procedural default.

Under Beck the

prejudice is that Mr. Andrews has been sentenced to death based upon a
constitutionally unreliable verdict of first degree murder.
IV. CONCLUSION
The merit of Mr. Andrews1 constitutional claim is clear.

Neither

abuse of the writ nor procedural default bars the claim.
The judgment of the district court should be reversed, and the
case remanded to the district court to vacate petitioner's sentence of
death and/or his conviction of first degree murder, or to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve any disputed factual issues revealed by
these proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this J £^vday of August, 1988.
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